


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1960 candidates before TV cameras: In Nixon's view, a program . . . the majority . . . wanted to see' STATINTL

elected. I will represent all the people."

Both Adams and Dr. Rodgers face tough opposition in their primary fights, and no one in Anniston gives either one of them much chance of winning.

"And so far, it's been awful quiet," said Police Chief J.L. Peck. "I don't expect we're going to have any trouble."

PEOPLE:

Nixon's Crises

"The easiest period in a crisis is actually the battle itself. The most difficult is the period of indecision—whether to fight or run away. And the most dangerous period is the aftermath . . ." In such an aftermath—the work-filled year since his defeat for the Presidency in 1960—Richard Nixon wrote these revealing words as part of an introduction to a revealing book on his spectacular political career.

At 47, midpoint in the careers of most men, the former Vice President soberly and painstakingly has set down the high points of his journey from Whittier, Calif., to Washington, D.C., in a memoir, "Six Crises," to be released March 29 by Doubleday & Co. (but already on sale in bookstores). The almost certainly best-selling book (460 pages, \$5.95) presents these glimpses of a complex, emotional, dedicated man, deeply involved in what he now considers the six climaxes of his public life.

►On the case of Alger Hiss: ". . . I suppose there may be a grain of truth in both of the observations that . . . had it not been for the Hiss case, I might have been President of the United States . . . Equally: Had it not been for the Hiss case, I might never have been Vice President of the United States and thus a candidate for President."

►On the "secret" campaign-fund controversy: When a heckler yelled, "Tell us

about the \$16,000 [the amount in the fund that led some Republican leaders to advise Nixon to resign from the Eisenhower ticket in 1952] . . . Instinctively I knew I had to counterattack. I let him have it: 'When I received the nomination for the Vice Presidency I was warned that if I continued to attack the Communists in this government they would continue to smear me . . .'

►On Eisenhower's 1955 heart attack: "Certainly I had no desire or intention to seize an iota of Presidential power. I was the Vice President and could be nothing more . . . My problem, what I had to do, was to provide leadership without appearing to lead."

►On the anti-U.S. mobs in Caracas: "After Caracas, when those charged with responsibility for our Latin American policy in the State Department tried to get proper treatment for their proposals, they could and usually did point to what happened in Caracas and Lima as a warning that we could no longer get by with fancy words . . ."

►Debate with Khrushchev in 1959: "To some, it may have looked as though we had both lost our temper. But actually the opposite was true. I had full and complete control of my temper and was aware of it . . . Khrushchev never lost his temper—he uses it."

►On the 1960 election: "It was not that I believed I should accept defeat with resignation. I have never had much sympathy for the point of view . . . whether you win or lose that counts, but how you play the game. How you play the game does count. But one must put top consideration on the will, the desire, and the determination to win."

Virtually everyone knows the external facts of all these crises, of course. What Nixon adds to the public record are his own personal embellishments—bits of a unique insight into Richard Nixon himself and his own emotions during

these trying and crucial encounters.

Speaking on the 1960 campaign, for example, Nixon vehemently denies that he lost because he ran a "me-too" campaign. "On the issues," he says, "I drew the line between us coldly and clearly, and could not have hit him harder than I did, with any sense of responsibility."

Actually, Nixon's drive for the Presidency was not a single crisis but a long series of problems—the secret meeting with Rockefeller; Nixon's defeat by John Kennedy in the first television debate; Nixon's long, dogged struggle to come back; the breathtakingly close election itself (out of 68,838,005 votes, a difference of 118,550 in the popular vote); and finally the dilemma of whether to challenge the Kennedy election on the ground of voting fraud.

Nixon charges that Mr. Kennedy, after a pre-election briefing by Allen Dulles, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, on how the U.S. was training Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro, then proceeded to come out publicly for such training, Nixon says.

Kennedy, with full knowledge of the facts, was jeopardizing the security of a United States foreign-policy operation for political purposes. Nixon, who was bound by security from saying that he had helped create that policy, is convinced that what appeared to be his "soft" stand on Fidel Castro cost him many votes.

Religious issues: Nixon also blames Robert F. Kennedy, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United Automobile Workers, and others for keeping the religious issue "squarely in the center of the campaign . . . They were, in short, contributing all they could to make religion an issue while obviously insisting that to do so was evidence of bigotry."

In "Six Crises," Nixon also writes that he and the then Attorney General William Rogers tried to persuade the White